Does access to capital affect cost stickiness? Evidence from China. by Cheng,  S. et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
26 September 2018
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Cheng, S. and Jiang, W. and Zeng, Y. (2018) 'Does access to capital aﬀect cost stickiness? Evidence from
China.', Asia-Paciﬁc journal of accounting and economics., 25 (1-2). pp. 177-198.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2016.1253483
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor Francis in Asia-Paciﬁc Journal of Accounting
Economics on 15 Nov 2016, available online:http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/16081625.2016.1253483.
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
  
 
 
 
Does Access to Capital Affect Cost Stickiness? Evidence from China 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We study the effect of limited access to capital on firm cost stickiness, using data from a 
large sample of Chinese private firms over 1998-2007. Our results show that on average SG&A 
costs are anti-sticky. For firms in regions with lower levels of financial development, SG&A costs 
have lower sensitivity to sales increases, and exhibit lower stickiness. Overall our findings suggest 
access to capital as an important determinant of cost stickiness.   
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1. Introduction 
In a perfect market, firms adjust their costs symmetrically according to activity changes 
(e.g., Horngren et al., 2012). However, previous empirical studies focus on publicly traded firms 
and document that costs are sticky – costs increase more when activity rises than decrease when 
activity falls by the same amount (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Calleja et al., 2006; Chen et al., 
2012; Banker et al., 2013). The implicit assumption in these studies is that firms can keep 
unutilized resources, which is generally true for those firms that have good access to capital (Reid 
and Smith, 2000; Holzhacker et al., 2015). However, this assumption may not hold for privately 
held and small firms with limited access to capital, and for such firms it is uncertain whether cost 
stickiness is prevalent. Using a unique, large sample from China that includes mainly privately-
held small firms, we extend previous literature by documenting that on average selling, general, 
and administrative (SG&A) costs are anti-sticky for small private firms, and firms with better 
access to capital have stronger cost stickiness or weaker anti-stickiness. 
We consider financing costs associated with limited access to capital as an important type 
of adjustment costs that affect cost behaviour (Doms and Dune, 1998; Abowd and Kramarz, 2003). 
As established in the literature, asymmetric adjustment costs1, as well as deliberate managerial 
decisions, are the main explanations of cost stickiness (Banker et al., 2011).  When firms reduce 
their capacity as sales decrease, they incur adjustment costs such as severance pay to terminate 
employment contracts, social pressures from media and regulators, and costs of fire sale of 
equipment and machines. When firms expand capacity in response to sales increase, they incur 
adjustment costs such as the costs of hiring and training new employees, the transaction costs of 
                                                 
1 We define adjustment costs as any costs incurred by firms when managers change capacity according to demand shocks, but 
adjustment costs and SG&A costs are different concepts. Adjustment costs may not necessarily be included in SG&A costs, but 
adjustment costs affect managerial decisions when managers adjust SG&A costs according to activity changes.  
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purchasing equipment and machines, and financing costs to obtain external financing (Bresnahan 
and Ramey, 1994; Doms and Dune, 1998; Cooper et al., 1999; Abowd and Kramarz, 2003; Nilsen 
and Schiantarelli, 2003).2 
In particular, firms with limited access to capital have higher costs of securing external 
financing during the capacity expansion periods3, which increases the upward adjustment costs. 
When activity decreases, firms with limited access to capital may suffer more decrease in the 
present value of revenue generated by a marginal capacity, as these firms have higher opportunity 
cost of capital and thus higher discount rates compared to firms with better access to capital. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that limited access to capital not only reduces contemporary capacity 
expansions associated with sales increases, but also weakens the degree of cost stickiness when 
sales decrease.  
To test our hypotheses, we exploit the regional financial development index in China, 
which is compiled by the National Economic Research Institute of China (Fan et al., 2010).  Our 
approach is based on the findings of prior studies that financial development levels have a major 
impact on firms’ access to capital (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998; Love, 2003). This approach has the following advantages. First, the credit market 
in China is dominated by state-owned banks, so macro-level factors such as monetary policy, 
government intervention, and financial development have significant effects on firms’ access to 
capital (Li et al., 2009). Second, regional financial development is relatively exogenous to firm-
level managerial decisions, whereas prior studies that use firm-level proxies for access to capital 
                                                 
2 Deliberate managerial decisions focus on managers’ behavior such as: their perception of future sales activity (Banker et al., 
2012a), incentive for earnings manipulation (Dierynck et al., 2012; Kama and Weiss, 2013), and empire building (Chen et al., 2012). 
3 Firms with limited access to capital also receive fewer amounts of loans and have stricter loan conditions such as restricted 
convents and debt maturity structure. These indirectly increase the firms’ external financing costs as well. For simplicity, we only 
discuss direct external financing costs in this paper. 
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usually suffer a more serious endogeneity problem (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010).4 Third, we focus 
on inter-region variations within one country, and hence, our sample is not subject to 
contamination of different accounting rules, taxation, and investor protection across countries.  
Our sample is extracted from the Annual Industrial Survey Database complied by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). After dropping observations with a few standard 
criterions in cost stickiness literature, which we discuss in detail in the third section, our final 
sample consists of 616,796 firms over the period of 1998-2007. Although 99.8% of the firms in 
our sample are not publicly traded, firms covered in our sample contribute to more than 90% of 
the industrial GDP of China. This database is suitable for our study because firms covered in the 
database do not have access to equity markets.5 Firms in our sample are also relatively smaller 
than firms studied in most prior cost stickiness literature. While bank loans are a major source of 
external financing for our sample firms, small firms in our sample usually have severe asymmetric 
information and weak bargaining power in the negotiations of bank loans. As a result, it is more 
difficult and costly for privately-held small firms to obtain external capital (e.g., Fazzari et al., 
1988; Peterson and Rajan, 1997; Whited and Wu, 2006). This problem is more pronounced for 
firms located in regions with lower levels of financial development. In particular, state-owned 
banks dominate the credit market in China, and they have stringent credit rationing and strong 
lending discrimination against privately held small firms (Bhabra et al., 2008; Li et al., 2009). 
Consistent with our hypotheses, our empirical results indicate that firms in regions with 
lower financial development not only have less contemporary capacity expansion associated with 
sales growth, but also have weaker cost stickiness. Our results also show that on average SG&A 
                                                 
4 Our study is similar to Banker et al. (2013) who use the country-level employment protection legislation as an exogenous proxy 
for downward labor adjustment costs. 
5 Dierynck et al. (2012) document cost stickiness in Belgian private firms, but they eliminate small firms from their sample and do 
not focus on the effect of access to capital on cost stickiness.  
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costs are anti-sticky. One possible explanation for the prevalence of cost anti-stickiness is that the 
overall level of financial development in China is relatively low over our sample period, and most 
of firms in our sample are private and small.  In other words, on average our sample firms have 
limited access to capital. 
While we interpret the results as evidence for the importance of access to capital in 
determining cost behavior, there are two alternative explanations. First, China’s unique legal, 
economic institutions and industry characteristics may be the driver of cost stickiness. To test this 
explanation, we analyse public firms in China that are in the same industries as our sample firms. 
The alternative explanation should apply to these firms, and we would expect to find cost anti-
stickiness for these firms. However, we find that costs are sticky for these firms, suggesting that 
China’s unique legal, economic institutions and industry characteristics are not likely to be the 
driver of the cost anti-stickiness in our sample. Second, it could be that the nature of being private 
alone is the driver of cost anti-stickiness.  If this alternative explanation holds, we would expect 
anti-stickiness for all private firms. However, we find that for larger private firms, who have better 
access to capital, costs are sticky, suggesting that being private alone is not likely to be the driver 
of the cost anti-stickiness we document.  
Our results are robust to a variety of different specifications, including different proxies for 
access to capital. In particular, we also take advantage of the 2004 Chinese macroeconomic 
regulation as an exogenous shock to firms’ external financing costs, and find that firms have a 
lower degree of cost stickiness in 2004 relative to 2003, and the effect is more pronounced for the 
five industries that are more heavily influenced by the regulations on lending.  
 Our study contributes to cost stickiness literature by showing that access to capital, a factor 
that was largely ignored before, affects cost behavior and managerial cost commitment decisions. 
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Anderson et al. (2003) and Banker et al. (2013) use asset intensity, employee intensity, and the 
strictness of country-level employee protection laws as proxies for different adjustment costs, and 
find these proxies to be positively related to cost stickiness.  Based on a large sample of private 
firms in China, we find that both the contemporary capacity expansion associated with activity 
increase and cost stickiness will be reduced when firms have more limited access to capital. 
Although we focus on small and private firms, these firms play important roles in various 
economies. For instance, small and medium enterprises in the US account for more than half of 
the private sector output, employ more than half of private sector workers, and provide 60%-80% 
of new jobs each year (Ou, 2006).  Similarly, small and medium enterprises in China account for 
about 60% of the market value of all industrial final products produced (Li, 2009). Mitchell and 
Reid (2000) argue that prior studies predominantly focus on management accounting in large firms 
and have long ignored the specifics of management accounting in small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Our paper provides empirical evidence that SMEs exhibit different cost 
stickiness from large public firms due to the limited access to capital.  
Our paper also sheds light on cost stickiness in China, an increasingly important economy 
in the world. The majority of the prior management accounting literature studies public firms in 
developed countries, while developing countries such as China, Brazil, Russia and Latin American 
countries are rarely studied (López and Hiebl, 2015). Furthermore, the management accounting 
practice of SMEs may be different between China and developed countries. Allen et al. (2005) 
find that it is difficult to explain Chinese economy growth by theories build upon developed 
economies. Anderson et al. (2003), and Calleja et al. (2006) document cost stickiness for US, UK, 
French, and German public firms, while Dall Via and Perego (2013) study SMEs in Italy and find 
evidence of cost anti-stickiness. Recently, Banker et al. (2011) examine public firms in China and 
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find cost stickiness for Chinese public firms. Our paper extends the previous cost stickiness 
literature by studying a large sample of Chinese private firms with various abilities to get access 
to capital.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
develops our hypothesis. Section 3 discusses our sample, data, and empirical methods. Main 
empirical evidence and additional tests are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature and hypotheses 
In a perfect market without frictions, the change in costs should be symmetric to the change 
in the level of activities (Noreen, 1991). However, Cooper and Kaplan (1992) and Noreen and 
Soderstrom (1997) question the validity of the assumption of cost symmetry and argue that costs 
can be asymmetric due to the adjustment costs and other market frictions. Consistent with this 
predication, Anderson et al. (2003) study a sample of US public firms and find that when activity 
changes by the same amount, SG&A costs increase more when activity rises than decrease when 
activity falls. Following Anderson et al. (2003), Calleja et al. (2006) and Banker et al. (2011) 
document cost stickiness in the samples of public firms in other countries.  
           Prior studies of sticky costs have relied on informal argument of adjustment costs and 
deliberate managerial decisions. Similar optimal decision rules have been formally modelled in 
the economics literature on dynamic factor demand (e.g., Hamermesh, 1989; Bentolila and Bertola, 
1990; Caballero, 1991; Abel and Eberly, 1994; Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996; Palm and Pfann, 
1997). In the equilibrium of a dynamic factor model, adjustment costs of marginal unit resource 
must be equal to the present value of cash flows generated by the marginal unit resource during its 
tenure (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Abel and Eberly, 1994).  One key insight from the dynamic 
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factor demand literature is that the optimal decision rules are generally asymmetric (e.g., Bentolila 
and Bertola, 1990; Caballero, 1991). For example, if the adjustment cost of resource reduction 
exceeds the adjustment cost of resource expansion, then managers will be reluctant to cut capacity 
when activity decreases. The same logic would apply for the cost stickiness analysis. When activity 
increases, managers will expand capacity as long as the net present value of the marginal capacity 
is positive. For example, an employee will be hired if the present value of the revenue generated 
by him is greater than the sum of the hiring costs and employee’s salary. Conversely, managers 
will reduce capacity when the net present value of the marginal capacity is negative, including the 
adjustment costs. For example, a marginal employee will be fired if the present value of the 
revenue generated by him is less than the sum of firing costs and employee’s salary. Managers 
may also consider the possibility that sales will recover in subsequent periods. So the present value 
of the expected hiring costs in the future may be added in the present value of the revenue generated 
by the marginal employee, when managers make the firing decision. The costs of securing external 
financing become important when firms have limited access to capital. Firstly, high costs of 
securing external financing would increase a firm’s opportunity cost of capital, that is, the discount 
rate in the NPV calculations. And the high discount rate would further reduce the present value of 
the revenue generated by the marginal capacity. Secondly, when firms need external financing to 
fund capacity expansion or keep unutilized capacity, the adjustment costs associated with 
financing would be higher. We argue that the costs of external financing should be considered as 
an adjustment cost in analyzing cost stickiness.  
 
2.1. Limited access to capital and adjustment costs 
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Previous literature suggests that firms incur adjustment costs to change the levels of labor 
forces or the capacity of equipment and machines (e.g., Bresnahan and Ramey, 1994; Doms and 
Dune, 1998; Cooper et al., 1999; Abowd and Kramarz, 2003; Nilsen and Schiantarelli, 2003).  And 
adjustment costs may differ for capacity reduction and for capacity expansion, causing costs to 
change asymmetrically (e.g., Abowd and Kramarz, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003; Ye and Duenyas, 
2007).   
It is worth noting that prior studies of cost stickiness implicitly assume that firms have 
sufficient access to capital (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003). Under this assumption, the studies focus 
on other types of adjustment costs and expect the adjustment costs to be smaller for capacity 
expansion than for capacity reduction (e.g., Jaramillo et al., 1993; Pfann and Palm, 1993; Abowd 
and Kramarz, 2003). Consistent with this expectation, previous empirical studies examine publicly 
traded firms and show evidence that costs are sticky (Anderson et al., 2003; Calleja et al., 2006).  
However, these studies examine publicly traded firms, which are generally larger and more 
established. For such firms the implicit assumption is more likely to hold, and adjustment costs 
are more likely to be higher for capacity reduction than for capacity expansion, consistent with the 
expectation of stickiness. Consequently, it remains unclear whether costs exhibit the same 
asymmetry for firms with limited access to capital. 
Firms with limited access to capital have difficulty in securing external financing and 
usually pay high costs of capital. As such, limited access to capital not only restrains capacity 
expansion when activity increases, but also reduces cost stickiness when activity decreases. Below, 
we illustrate the role of limited access to capital using labor hiring as an example:  
1. Higher capacity expansion costs: to make hiring decisions associated with activity 
increases, managers trade the present value of revenue generated by the marginal worker against 
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the hiring costs. Firms with limited access to capital have higher external financing costs than firms 
with good access to capital. All else being equal, firms with limited access to capital are likely to 
have larger hiring costs and fewer contemporary new hires associated with activity increases, due 
to the difficulty of raising external capital to fund the expansion. 
2. Higher opportunity cost of capital: the discount rate used for calculating the present 
value of the revenue generated by the marginal worker should be the firm’s opportunity cost of 
capital.  Firms with limited access to capital have higher opportunity cost of capital than firms with 
good access to capital. All else being equal, firms with limited access to capital have the lower 
present value of revenue generated by the marginal worker. All other things being equal, firms 
with limited access to capital would have fewer contemporary new hires associated with activity 
increases. Similarly, to make firing decisions associated with activity decreases, managers trade 
the reduced present value of revenue generated by the marginal worker against current firing costs. 
All else being equal, firms with limited access to capital would fire more workers associated with 
activity decreases.  
3. Higher costs to retain slack resource: one important explanation of cost stickiness is that 
managers retain slack resources not only to save on current period firing costs, but also to reduce 
future hiring costs if sales recover in subsequent periods (Weiss, 2010). When firms have limited 
access to capital, it would be more difficult to retain unutilized workers especially when activity 
decreases (Holzhacker et al., 2015). Opler et al. (1998) find that firms with limited access to capital 
tend to hold higher ratios of cash to total non-cash assets. Therefore, firms with high external 
financial costs may choose to remove excess capacity for the precautionary reason. All else being 
equal, firms with limited access to capital would retain less slack resources, which would reduce 
cost stickiness.  
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The above argument also applies when firms adjust their equipment and machines 
according to the activity changes. Importantly, adjustment costs of expanding capacity may 
involve securing external financing (Doms and Dune, 1998; Abowd and Kramarz, 2003), leading 
to very high adjustment costs associated with financing for firms with limited access to capital. 
And firms with limited access to capital have difficulty in keeping unutilized resources.  
Although the effect of limited access to capital on cost stickiness depends on legal and 
financial institutions of individual economies, we argue that this effect may be more pronounced 
in China. Despite the high economic growth over the past few decades, China’s financial markets 
are still less established than developed economies (Allen et al., 2005). For instance, only a small 
portion of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have received the approval for issuing public 
corporate bonds from the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).  
Private funds in China are only in the infant stage. Thus, bank loans are the main source of external 
financing for most Chinese firms. However, state-owned banks dominate Chinese credit market, 
and they have stringent credit rationing and strong lending discrimination against privately-held 
small and non-SOE firms (Bhabra et al., 2008; Li et al., 2009). As a result, it is much more difficult 
for privately-held small and non-SOE firms to obtain loans from Chinese state-owned banks than 
for publicly traded large and SOE firms.  
In summary, compared to firms with better access to capital, firms with limited access to 
capital are likely to expand capacity less as sales increase, and reduce capacity more as sales 
decrease.6 In other words, we expect limited access to capital to not only reduce contemporary 
                                                 
6 Except for the above three aspects, limited access to capital may affect cost stickiness indirectly through the agency problem or 
managerial forecasts. For example, managers of firms with financial constraints have less free cash flows, and their incentives to 
retain redundant capacity are weaker, which leads to weaker cost stickiness. Similarly, managers of firms with financial constraints 
may be more pessimistic, which also leads to weaker cost stickiness. When we control for the agency problem or managerial 
forecasts in our empirical analysis, our results are robust. 
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capacity expansion associated with activity increase, but also lower the degree of cost stickiness.  
Thus, we have the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with limited access to capital have lower contemporary capacity 
expansion associated with sales increase.  
Hypothesis 2: Firms with limited access to capital have lower degree of cost stickiness. 
 
 
3. Sample and data 
3.1. Sample firm selection 
We collect our sample from the Annual Industrial Survey Database, compiled by the National 
Bureau of Statistic of China (NBSC). The database covers all Chinese firms from 1998 to 2009 
that have annual sales above RMB 5 million7 and are in the mining and quarrying, manufacturing, 
and utility industries. We restrict our sample period to be 1998-2007 because the firm identification 
codes are no longer reliable after 2007 and this sample period is not influenced by the recent 2008 
global financial crisis. In total, our sample includes 616,796 unique firms, with a total number of 
2,228,727 firm-year observations. The NBSC mainly collect the firm characteristic data such as 
firm ownership, and accounting data such as total assets, total debts, sales, and operating profits. 
The accuracy of the data has been confirmed in the previous literature, for example, Chuang and 
Hsu (2004), Cull et al. (2009), and Li et al. (2009). The firms in our sample represent more than 
90% of the industrial GDP of China, suggesting that it is important in its own to understand cost 
accounting practices of these firms. 
                                                 
7 Some firms in the database do have annual sales lower than RMB 5 million. Our main results are robust if we exclude these firms 
from the sample.  
12 
 
The Annual Industrial Survey Database is suitable for our study on the relationship between 
access to capital and firm cost stickiness for three reasons. Frist, 99.8% of the firms in the database 
are privately held. Private firms have little access to equity markets and mainly rely on bank loan 
finance in China. Secondly, the firms in the database differ greatly in firm size. And most of them 
are small. Previous literature have documented that small and privately held firms have more 
difficulties to get bank loans from Chinese banks than stated-owned and publicly listed firms 
(Bhabra et al., 2008; Li et al., 2009). Therefore firms in our sample may have limited access to 
capital markets. Thirdly, our sample firms are located in 31 regions 8 , which include 4 
municipalities, 5 autonomous regions and 22 provinces. The levels of financial market 
development across these regions are quite different, which is suitable for our study on the effect 
of exogenous limited access to capital on cost stickiness.  
Although privately-held small and non-SOE firms have limited access to capital, they might 
be affiliated with business groups and such structure provides internal capital market for those 
firms (e.g., Fan et al. 2011). Using an annual survey conducted by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), which includes the information on each firm's group affiliation is from, He 
et al. (2013) find that business groups help member firms overcome constraints in raising external 
capital, and that the internal capital market within a business group is more likely to be an 
alternative financing channel among SOEs than among Non-SOEs. However, the majority of firms 
in our sample are non-SOEs, we show that when we limit our analyses to only non-SOEs, we still 
find the similar results. In addition, to the degree that the affiliation with a business group is stable 
over time, the inclusion of firm fixed effects in our regressions should mitigate the concern of the 
internal capital market within business groups. We still find the similar results after controlling for 
                                                 
8 Firms in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are not included in our sample. 
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firm fixed effects. The other weakness of our sample is that we don’t have detailed information 
for the measurement of access to capital used in literature studying public firms, such as firm-bank 
relationship.  
          Similar to Anderson et al. (2003) and other studies, we delete firms with duplicate IDs, 
observations with missing financial and operating information as well as information on a firm’s 
ownership structure, and observations with errors such as non-positive total assets, non-positive 
sales etc.  We also delete observations in which SG&A costs are greater than sales revenue in the 
same year, and observations without sales revenue or SG&A costs data for two consecutive years. 
Our final sample includes 242,703 firms and a total of 1,051,966 firm-year observations. SG&A 
costs,9 sales revenue, and other financial variables for all firms in our sample are collected from 
the Annual Industrial Survey Database. 
NBSC classify all firms covered in the Annual Industrial Survey Database into three main 
categories: mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and production and supply of electricity, gas and 
water.  And NBSC further divide three main categories into thirty-nine industries based on each 
firm’s 2-digit standard industry classification (SIC) applied. The detailed information on the each 
industry definition can be found in the appendix. 
  
                                                 
9 We use the sum of sales costs and administration costs in the database to approximate SG&A costs. For industrial firms in 1998, 
joint-stock enterprises followed the Accounting System for Joint Stock Limited Enterprises, the others followed the Accounting 
System for Industrial Firms. Since 2001, all firms followed the Accounting System for Business Enterprises, with the Specific 
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises as a supplement. Since 2005, the Accounting System of Small Enterprises has been 
introduced, and small firms can choose to follow either the Accounting System of Small Enterprises or the Accounting System for 
Business Enterprises. Although Chinese accounting system experienced several reforms during the period between 1998 and 2007, 
the definitions and main items of sales costs and administration costs are consistent across our sample period and across private 
versus publicly traded firms, and are comparable to those of SG&A costs in the US, except minor changes of items of administration 
costs in 2007. Since 2007, all firms began to follow the newly introduced Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises, which 
substitutes for the Accounting System for Business Enterprises and the Specific Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises. 
According to the 2007 Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises, bad debt expense is not included in administration costs in 
China any more, while it is included in SG&A costs in the US. Our results are robust when we delete the observations in 2007. In 
addition, we also examine the stickiness of property, plant and equipment (PP&E) costs, which are less subject to accounting 
disclosure and tax regulations in terms of SG&A change, and find the similar results.  
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3.2. Proxy for access to capital 
Our study focuses on the relation between access to capital and cost stickiness. We use 
regional financial development as a proxy for access to capital, because previous studies find that 
regional financial development has a positive effect on firms’ ability to raise fund externally.  For 
example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that well developed financial markets help a firm to 
mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection problems, hence lowering the firm's external financing 
cost. Consistent with this prediction, Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that industries that are reliant 
on external financing show greater growth in financially developed countries. Similarly, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) find that firm growth financed by long-term external debt 
and equity is positively associated with the level of a country's financial development. Love (2003) 
finds that firms in developed countries with better financial development have better access to 
external capital and thus higher investment. Beck et al. (2004) and Ayyagari et al. (2011) also find 
that financial development can mitigate a firm’s limited access to capital in emerging economies.  
           Specifically, we use the regional financial market development index, compiled by the 
National Economic Research Institute of China, as an relatively exogenous proxy for access to 
capital.10 The National Economic Research Institute of China develops five indices to measure 
regional marketization level: relationship between government and market; non-state owned 
economic market development; product marketization; factor market development; and market 
intermediary and law.11  
                                                 
10 The index has been used by a number of prior studies (Wang et al., 2008; Firth et al., 2009; Li et al., 2009). 
11 Two principles are followed when these indices are established. At first, each of these five indices has at least two first level 
sub-indices. And each first-level sub-index can indicate one fundamental characteristic of marketization within a certain time 
period. Unreported techniques are applied to eliminate any non-market related noises in these indices. Second, every index is 
measurable and based on reliable and objective data sources.  Survey data is also used if actual data is unavailable.  
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          The financial market development index is one of the four first-level sub-indices of factor 
market development. It measures the degree of competition in each regional financial market. The 
financial market development index is composed by two second-level sub-indices: financial 
lending allocation index and financial competition index. The financial lending allocation index is 
measured by the proportion of loans received by non-state owned firms to the total loans from 
financial institution. And the financial competition index is measured by the ratio of amount 
deposited in non-state owned financial institutions to total amount deposited in all financial 
institutions.  
          To calculate each sub-index, the National Economic Research Institute of China set a base 
year. According to the raw scores of the region in a particular criterion, a region with the highest 
(lowest) scores receives an index value of 10 (0) in the base year.  Then, for the rest of regions, 
their index value is calculated by: 
10
minmax
min 



VV
VV
Index ii  
where Vi is region raw score on criterion i, Vmax is the highest raw score on criterion i, Vmin is the 
lowest raw score in criterion i.   
         To compare the index value over time, index value after the base year is calculated by: 
10
0min,0max,
0min,,
, 



VV
VV
Index
ti
ti  
where subscript t represents year and subscript 0 represents base year. 
        The first-level indices are the weighted average of second-level sub-indices. Both arithmetic 
average and principal component analysis methods are applied when calculating the weights. 
Because the value of indices is very close between these two methods, only arithmetic average 
method has been used by the National Economic Research Institute of China since 2004. A higher 
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score of the index indicates more developed financial markets in the region, and better access to 
capital. 
           Although the regional financial development index does not directly measure access to 
capital at the firm-level, our approach offers a few advantages. Firstly, as the credit market in 
China is dominated by state-owned banks, macro-level factors such as monetary policy, 
government intervention, and financial development have significant effects on firms’ external 
financing costs (Li et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2014). Secondly, our proxy of access to capital at the 
region level suffers less of endogenous concerns compared with proxies of access to capital at the 
firm-level, such as leverage. Thirdly, we focus on different regions in one country, and mitigate 
the confounding effects of cross-country differences in legal and political environments and 
accounting, tax, and financial policies. Finally, there are sufficient variations in financial 
developments across different regions in China. When China opened its economy in 1978, the 
Chinese government implemented an unbalanced development strategy. That is, to permit some 
people and some regions to become prosperous first, for the purpose of achieving common 
prosperity more quickly. Regions on the east coast of China received more favorable government 
policies and they also have geographical location advantages. Because of the higher return on 
investment on coastal regions, most domestic funds and foreign investments flew into these 
regions.  As a result, the economic and financial development gap has been widened between the 
coastal and inland regions during our sample period. 
3.3. Descriptions of the sample 
The summary statistics of our sample are reported in Table 1. We winsorize all the 
accounting variables used in our empirical analyses on both sides by 0.5% to mitigate the possible 
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outlier effect.12 In order to facilitate the comparison of our sample and those of prior studies, we 
use the descriptive statistics reported in Anderson et al. (2003) as benchmarks. 
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive information about total assets, annual revenues 
and SG&A costs. Over the period between 1999 and 2007, the mean (median) of total assets is 
RMB 56.82 (18.20) million, the mean (median) of sales revenue is RMB 59.93 (23.13) million, 
and the mean (median) of SG&A costs is RMB 5.19 (1.83) million. We use the exchange rate of 
1:6.57 in January 2011 to restate the numbers in the US dollar.13 The results indicate that firms in 
our sample are much smaller than those studied in Anderson et al. (2003). For example, the average 
sales revenue (SG&A costs) is $1,277.09 ($229.45) million for their sample firms, about 140 times 
(290 times) as large as the average sales revenue (SG&A costs) of $9.12 ($0.79) million for our 
sample firms. Panel A of Table 1 also reports SG&A costs as the percentage of sales revenue. The 
results show that the average (median) of the percentage is 11.55% (8.17%).  Although these 
numbers are smaller than the 26.41% (22.62%) reported in Anderson et al. (2003), they still 
suggest that SG&A costs are important to cost management.  Our data offers a unique setting to 
examine cost management in a large sample with sufficient variations in firm size. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows that sales revenue declines for 31.64% of the firm-year 
observations in our sample and SG&A costs decreases for 37.97% of the sample firm-year 
observations. Both of these numbers are greater than the corresponding numbers (27.01% and 
24.98%) in Anderson et al. (2003), suggesting that decreases in sales and SG&A costs are more 
frequent in our sample than in Anderson et al. (2003). Similarly, the magnitudes of the decreases 
are also larger in our sample than in theirs.  For example, the mean decreases in sales revenue and 
                                                 
12 We also find the similar results when we use 1% to deal with the outliers. 
13 If we use exchange rate back in period 1999-2007, the firm size in our sample is even smaller because of the even higher 
exchange rate between the RMB and the US dollar.  
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SG&A costs in our sample are 23.14% and 26.55% respectively, whereas the corresponding 
numbers in their sample are 17.45% and 15.67%. In addition, sales decrease is smaller than SG&A 
decrease (23.14% vs. 26.55%) in our sample, while the opposite is true (17.5% vs. 15.67%) in the 
sample of Anderson et al. (2003).  Finally, decreases in sales and SG&A costs are more volatile in 
our sample than in Anderson et al (2003). The standard deviation of the decrease in sales revenue 
(SG&A costs) is 20.27% (22.67%) in our sample and 18.64% (16.4%) in theirs, which might be 
explained by the fact that our sample firms are in an emerging market and face more volatile 
operating environment.  
Panel C reports the summary statistics of the financial market index, and its two sub-indices: 
the financial lending allocation index and the financial competition index. The minimum value of 
both the financial market development index and the financial lending allocation index is 0. The 
financial market development index has a maximum value at 12.01 and the standard deviation of 
2.42. And the financial lending index has a maximum value at 14.03 and the standard deviation of 
3.31. The index value can be higher (lower) than 10 (0) in a given year, if the raw score of the 
index is larger (smaller) than the historical high (low). Panel D reports the summary statistics of 
our key variables across 31 regions. The results show significant variations in the indices across 
these regions. 
 
4. Analysis and results 
4.1. Main analysis 
        Previous cost stickiness studies (Calleja et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2012; Banker et al., 2013) 
normally use Anderson et al. (2003) regression as their basic model: 
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The intuition of this regression model is to test the significance of the marginal effect of sales 
decrease on the sensitivity of SG&A cost changes to the sales revenue changes. In this model, 
Decrease_Dummyi,t  is a  binary variable, which is equal to 1 if sales revenue of firm i for period t 
decreases from period t-1, and 0 otherwise.  The coefficient of Decrease_Dummy (λ1) captures the 
direction of cost stickiness. When λ1 is significantly negative, the increase in SG&A associated 
with 1% sales increase is γ1 percent, while the decrease in SG&A costs associated with 1% sales 
decrease is γ1+ λ1 (<γ1  percent), suggesting that SG&A costs are sticky.  On the other hand, when 
λ1 is significantly positive, the increase in SG&A costs associated with 1% sales increase is γ1 
percent, while the decrease in SG&A costs associated with 1% sales decrease is γ1+ λ1 (>γ1  percent), 
suggesting that SG&A costs are anti-sticky. Industryi,t and Yeari,t are industry and year dummy 
variables. 
           We use heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for all regressions in this study, 
because our sample includes a large number of firms with various firm characteristics. The first 
column in Panel A of Table 2 reports the results of model (1). Contrary to the previous findings 
that SG&A costs are sticky (e.g., Anderson et al. 2003), we find a significantly positive λ1 in the 
whole sample, indicating that SG&A costs for our sample firms are anti-sticky. The estimated 
value of γ1 is 0.5540, indicating that SG&A costs rise by 0.55% per 1% increase in sales revenue14. 
                                                 
14 Although the coefficients on γ1 is higher than that in Anderson et al. (2003), we argue that it is hard to compare the estimates of 
the two studies for a few reasons: 1) cross-sample comparisons of coefficients may not be appropriate, especially the within sample 
variable variances in our sample and Anderson et al. (2003)’s sample are different; 2) the definitions of the SG&A costs are not 
exactly the same between US and China; 3) we have public companies and SOEs, we re-estimate the coefficients after excluding 
these firms, and find the coefficient is lower than before; 4) legal and economic institutions are different between China and US.   
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The estimated value of λ1 is 0.0117, indicating that SG&A costs fall by γ1+ λ1= 0.5657, or about 
0.57% per 1% decrease in sales revenue. The results show that SG&A costs decrease significantly 
more when activity falls than they increase when activity rises by the same amount, indicating 
anti-stickiness of SG&A costs. 
              One possible explanation of cost anti-stickiness in our sample is that, as we discussed 
earlier, privately-held small and non-SOE firms have very limited access to external capital 
(Bhabra et al., 2008; Li et al., 2009). This situation is inconsistent with the implicit assumption 
made in prior studies that firms have sufficient access to capital (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003).  To 
the credit of prior studies, which focus on publicly listed firms, this implicit assumption is more 
likely to be true, and these prior studies focus on other types of adjustment costs and expect the 
adjustment costs to be smaller for capacity expansion than for capacity reduction (e.g., Jaramillo 
et al., 1993; Pfann and Palm, 1993; Abowd and Kramarz, 2003). Consistent with this expectation, 
previous empirical evidence shows that costs are sticky (Anderson et al., 2003; Calleja et al., 2006). 
However, for those small private firms with limited access to capital, their costs may be less sticky 
or even anti-sticky on average.  
            Meanwhile, there are two alternative explanations for anti-sticky costs: (1) China’s unique 
legal, economic institutions and industry characteristics may lead to cost anti-stickiness; (2) most 
of the sample firms are private. To rule out these two alternative explanations, we first collect all 
Chinese public firm data between 1998 and 2007 from China Stock Market & Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database, and test our basic model (1) in this sample of Chinese public firms. 
Because the private firms in our sample are in three main industries (i.e., mining and quarrying, 
manufacturing, and production and supply of electricity, gas and water), we first test public firms 
that are also in these three industries. Next we test all public firms that are in the other industries. 
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The results in columns (2) – (4) of Panel A of Table 2 show cost stickiness in all Chinese public 
firms, suggesting that the anti-stickiness is unlikely to be driven by Chinese legal features and 
industry characteristics, since the legal features would apply to all Chinese firms, public and 
private, and the industry characteristics would affect to all firms in the same industries. 
Second, we keep only private firms in our main sample and divide them into three 
subsamples by firm size, which is measured by the nature logarithm of total assets. We test the 
basic model (1) in these three subsamples. The results in Panel B of Table 2 show that, SG&A 
costs are anti-sticky in the small firm sample, not sticky in the median firm sample, and sticky in 
the large firm sample. These results suggest that being private (i.e., not publicly traded) alone does 
not warrant anti-stickiness. It is therefore unlikely that our finding is just driven by the fact that 
most of our sample firms are private.  
            To investigate the effect of access to capital on cost stickiness, we further specify γ1 and λ1 
in model (1) as a function of the regional financial development index variable (RFD):
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We use three different definitions of the RFD variable in model (2). RFD1 is a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 if a firm is located in a region with the financial development index above the 
sample median, and 0 otherwise. RFD2 is the original value of the regional financial development 
index. And RFD3 is the natural logarithm of the regional financial development index. Similar to 
Banker et al. (2013), we allow RFD to affect both the slope for revenue increases and the degree 
of cost stickiness in model (1). This is because access to capital may affect managerial decisions 
                                                 
15 We find the similar results when including the interaction term between RFD and Decrease_Dummy in model (2).  
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when sales decrease as well as when sales increase. The coefficient γ2 represents the effect of 
access to capital on the SG&A costs when sales increase. Our first hypothesis predicts γ2 to be 
positive.   
Our second hypothesis predicts λ2 to be negative. Since λ1 is generally positive and anti-
stickiness prevails in our sample, a negative λ2 implies that cost anti-stickiness becomes weaker as 
financial development reaches higher levels and firms have better access to capital. To express the 
same notion for stickiness, a negative λ2 implies that cost stickiness becomes stronger as financial 
development reaches higher levels and firms have better access to capital.   
           The results of model (2) in Table 3 are consistent with our hypotheses. For all three 
definitions of the RFD variable, γ2 is significantly positive, suggesting that in regions with higher 
levels of financial development, where firms have better access to capital, capacity expansion 
increases more as sales increase.  In particular, γ2 on RFD1 is 0.0341, suggesting that when sales 
increase by 1%, SG&A costs of firms in the regions with the high financial market development 
index will grow 0.0341% more than the increase of SG&A costs of firms in the regions with the 
low financial market development index.  
Similarly, λ2 is significantly negative at 1% level, indicating that firms located in the 
regions with higher levels of financial development have weaker anti-stickiness, or stronger degree 
of cost stickiness. In particular, λ2 on RFD1 is -0.0652, suggesting that when sales decrease by 1%, 
SG&A costs of firms in the regions with high financial market development index will drop 0.0652% 
less than the decrease of SG&A costs of firms in the regions with low financial market 
development index16.  
                                                 
16 Among 1,051,966 firm-year observations in our sample, 322,292 firm-year observations are SOEs. We also separate our sample 
by SOEs and non-SOEs, and then test the model (2) in these two subsamples. We find that although in both SOEs and non-SOEs, 
λ2 is significantly negative, the absolute value of λ2  is significantly lower in SOEs than that in non-SOEs.   
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We also replace the RFD variable by the second-level sub-index of financial competition 
index (RFC) and financial lending allocation (RLA), and then re-estimate the model (2) in the full 
sample and non-SOE sample. As shown in Table 4, our results are robust with the RLA variable. 
However, λ2  is not significant in the full sample when we replace the RFD variable by the RFC 
variable. The possible explanations are: (1) the financial competition may have both positive and 
negative effects on firms’ access to capital (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Guzman, 2000; Cetorelli 
and Gambera, 2001; Beck et al., 2004); (2) the financial competition index is measured as the ratio 
of the amount deposited in non-state owned financial institutions to the total amount deposited in 
all financial institutions. The index itself may not be a suitable proxy for access to capital.  
           As suggested by Anderson et al. (2003), we further extend model (2) by including the 
following four control variables: Successive_Decreasei,t, Growthi,t, AIi,t, and EIi,t, respectively. 
Similar to Anderson et al. (2003), we define Successive_Decreasei,t as a dummy variable equal to 
1 if revenue in period t-1 is less than revenue in t-2, 0 otherwise. Growthi,t is the percentage growth 
in real Chinese GNP during year t. AIi,t is the asset intensity defined as the assets to sales revenue 
ratio.  EIi,t is the employee intensity defined as the employees to sales revenue ratio. To control for 
the different economy growth rates across regions, we also include the percentage growth of real 
GNP in each region (RGDP) as a control variable. Table 5 shows that our results are robust to the 
inclusion of more control variables. The extended model in Table 5 is defined as: 
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         In models (2) and (3), we simply define γ1 and λ1 in model (1) as a linear combination of the 
RFD variable and the other control variables. Following Banker et al. (2012), we test model (2) 
and model (3) using two-way clustering by region and by year.17 Results reported in Table 6 are 
not consistent with our first hypothesis but are consistent with our second hypothesis. Although 
the coefficient of RFD (γ2) is insignificant in a regression with two-way clustering by region and 
by year, the coefficient of RFD dummy (λ2) is significantly negative, supporting that firms in the 
regions with high financial development index have higher cost stickiness.  
          Our results are still consistent with both hypotheses when we replace the RFD variable by 
the RLA variable in models (2) and (3). Table 7 shows that γ2 on RLA is significantly positive, 
indicating that firms with better access to capital expands capacity more as sales increase. The 
results also show that λ2 on RLA is significantly negative at the 1% level, which is consistent with 
our expectation that firms with better access to capital have higher cost stickiness. The results thus 
far have established a robust link between access to capital and cost stickiness. We next further 
validate our approach in a different way. 
           We take advantage of the 2004 Chinese macroeconomic regulation as an exogenous shock 
to firms’ external financing costs. Between 1998 and 2003, the Chinese government remained its 
loose monetary and fiscal policy and kept stimulating the Chinese economy. As a result, by the 
end of 2003, Chinese economy was overheated. In response to this problem, at the beginning of 
2004, the Chinese government issued a series of macroeconomic regulations and control policies 
that essentially tightened the regulations on lending and made it more difficult for firms to secure 
                                                 
17 In our large panel data, we have firm observations over ten years and across 31 regions. It is natural to assume that error terms 
(εi,t) are correlated within each region and over the time dimension. We use the two-way clustered standard errors by region and by 
year based on the formula in Cameron and Miller (2011). In this paper, we assume that firms in regions with different financial 
development levels would have different ability to get access to capital. Therefore we choose to cluster error terms by region, 
instead of by firm itself. And our two-way clustering method is robust to an arbitrary pattern of within-region correlations and an 
arbitrary pattern of serial correlation within each region. 
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bank loans. We investigate the effect of the regulations on cost stickiness using a balanced panel 
sample from 2003 and 2004. 18 Specifically, we define TLR to be 1 for 2004 and 0 for 2003. Then 
we replace the regional financial development index variable by the TLR dummy variable in 
models (2) and (3). Because firms have more limited access to bank loans in 2004 than in 2003, 
we expect firms to have a lower degree of cost stickiness in 2004 relative to 2003. In addition, 
because the regulations mainly involve the industries of mining of ferrous metal ores (In3), mining 
of non-ferrous metal ores (In4), manufacture of textile (In11), manufacture and processing of 
ferrous metals (In26), and manufacture and processing of non-ferrous metals (In27), we expect the 
effect of the regulations to be stronger for these five industries than for the other industries.  
The results in Table 8 indicate that for the full sample, the coefficient of TLR (γ2) is 
significantly negative when control variables are not included and insignificant when control 
variables are included. And the coefficient of TLR dummy (λ2) is always significantly positive, 
suggesting that firms in the period of more limited access to capital have lower cost stickiness. 
Further results in Table 8 show that these effects are more pronounced for the five industries that 
are more heavily influenced by the regulations on lending. These results confirm our hypotheses 
1 and 2.  
 
4.2. Further robustness checks 
We also conduct a set of additional tests and find similar results.19 These tests are based on 
                                                 
18 As the instruments and target industries involved in the 2005 and 2006 Chinese macroeconomic regulation are different from 
those in the 2004 macroeconomic regulation, we only use the sample from 2003 and 2004 to examine the effect of the 2004 
macroeconomic regulations. 
19 We also use the firm-level cost asymmetry measure in Weiss (2010), but do not find significant results. A possible reason is that 
when we adopt the Weiss (2010) cost asymmetry measure, we lose 97% of our observations, and only relatively large firms 
remain in the sample. While Weiss (2010) uses quarterly data, we only have yearly observations. To obtain the Weiss (2010) 
measure using yearly observations for a firm, the firm must 1) have data over at least three and up to five consecutive years, and 
2) have sales and costs changing in the same direction. In our sample, only 3% of our firm-year observations, mainly from large 
firms, satisfy these two conditions simultaneously. 
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extensions of model (2), and are listed below:  (1) We control for firm listing situation dummy, 
firm ownership type dummy, firm age, liquidity ratio, leverage, lagged changes in sales, product 
market competition20 , magnitude of sales changes and aggregate sales and costs over longer 
periods following Anderson et al. (2003). (2) Following Anderson and Lanen (2007), we control 
for industry dummies and allow the coefficients to change across industries. (3) We control for 
cost structure by using the revised model of Balakrishan et al. (2015). (4) Following the 
suggestions of Dierynck et al. (2012) and Kama and Weiss (2013), we control for managerial 
earnings management incentives. (5) We follow Banker et al. (2012a) to control for managerial 
expectations. (6) We follow Chen et al. (2012) to control for agency problem of empire building. 
We use uncertainty of future sales to proxy for agency problem of empire building, as in firms with 
high uncertainty of future sales, it maybe more difficult to monitor the managers. (7) To mitigate 
the concern of clustered errors and heteroskedasticity, we further cluster all regression standard 
errors by industry and use Huber-White robust standard error estimators within each industry. (8) 
We adjust the financial variables based on annual inflation rates. (9) We exclude the region with 
highest financial market development index value in each year. 
5. Conclusions 
Previous cost behavior literature studies publicly traded firms and document that costs are 
sticky (Anderson et al., 2003; Calleja et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2012; Banker et al., 2013). We 
extend the literature by examining whether the findings of prior studies hold for private firms with 
limited access to external capital.  Using a large sample of Chinese private firms, we show that 
SG&A costs are on average anti-sticky. We also find that firms with limited access to capital have 
                                                 
20 We use concentration50 ratio, which is defined as the market shares of the 50 largest firms over all the firms in the same 
industry, to proxy for product market competition.  
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lower contemporary capacity expansion associated with sales increase, as well as stronger cost 
anti-stickiness or weaker cost stickiness. 
We contribute to the literature on cost behavior by showing how access to capital affects 
the direction and magnitude of cost stickiness. The results suggest that the stickiness of SG&A 
costs documented in prior studies that examine publicly traded, relatively large firms do not 
generalize to firms with limited access to capital, such as small and private firms in our sample. 
This finding is important given smaller firms play significant roles in many economies around the 
world. We also contribute to the literature by examining cost behavior in Chinese firms. Despite 
the increasing importance of Chinese economy, our understanding of cost accounting practice in 
China is limited. Nevertheless, like most prior studies, due to data availability limitation and the 
endogeneity problem we use regional financial development index as an relatively exogenous 
proxy and are unable to measure access to capital directly. Future studies may seek to link firm 
financing costs to adjustment costs more directly to generate new insight into how external 
financing costs affect cost stickiness. In addition, anti-sticky costs cannot be derived by limited 
access to capital ex-ante and anti-sticky costs may be caused by multiple factors, limited access to 
capital is just one of those factors. Future studies may seek to incorporate other factors to explain 
the anti-sticky costs.  
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics 
Panel A：Distribution of Annual Revenue and SG&A Costs for Full Sample from 1999 to 2007 
This table presents the distribution of annual revenue and SG&A costs for the full sample. All the reported 
numbers are in millions of RMB. We convert RMB value into US dollar value by using exchange rate 1:6.57 (as 
of 01/2011). The distribution of sales revenue and SG&A costs is for 1,050,270 firm-year observations during 
the period between 1999 and 2007 in the Chinese Annual Industrial Survey Database. The sample selection 
process is discussed in the paper.   
 
            Mean            Standard     
          
Deviation 
   Lower    
Quartile 
  Median  Upper 
Quartile 
Total assets 
   (RMB) 
 56.82 124.48 8.08      18.20  48.7 
Sales revenue 
   (RMB) 
 59.93 119.29 10.86   23.13 55.79 
SG&A costs 
 (RMB) 
5.19 11.06 0.79 1.83 4.65 
SG&A costs  
as a % of sales  11.55%  11.33% 4.32% 8.17% 14.71% 
Total assets 
 (Dollars) 
 8.65  18.95 1.23 2.77 7.41 
Sales revenue 
   (Dollars) 
9.12 18.15 1.65 3.52 8.49 
SG&A costs 
   (Dollars) 
0.79 1.68 0.12 0.28 0.71 
 
 
Panel B：Periodic Fluctuations in Revenue and SG&A Costs for Full Sample from 1999 to 2007 
This table presents the periodic fluctuations in revenue and SG&A costs for the full sample. In the first column, 
we report the percentage of firm year observations with a negative sales revenue growth rate and SG&A growth 
rate. In the other columns, we report summary statistics of observations with sales revenue and SG&A costs 
decline from the previous year.  
 
 Percentage of 
Firm-years 
with Negative 
Percentage 
Change from 
Previous 
Period 
Mean 
Percentage 
Decrease 
Across 
Periods 
Standard 
Deviation of 
Percentage 
Decreases 
Across 
Periods 
Lower 
Quartile of 
Percentage 
Decreases 
Across 
Periods 
Median 
Percentage 
Decrease 
Across 
Periods 
Upper 
Quartile of 
Percentage 
Decreases 
Across 
Periods 
Sales revenue 31.64% 23.14% 20.27% 7.27% 17.45% 33.57% 
SG&A costs 37.97% 26.55% 22.67% 8.52% 20.09% 39.09% 
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Panel C: Summary Statistics of Indices in the Whole Sample 
This table presents the summary statistics of financial market index, financial lending allocation index and 
financial competition index in our whole sample from 1998-2007. The financial lending allocation index and 
financial competition index are the sub-indices of the financial market index. 
 
  Mean   Std. Dev.     Min         Max 
Financial Market Index 5.75 2.50 0.00 12.01 
Financial Lending Allocation Index 6.06 3.26 0.00 14.03 
Financial Competition Index 4.85 2.84 0.00 12.41 
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Panel D: Summary Statistics of Key Variables by 31 Regions 
This table presents the number of observations and the average of our key variables by 31 regions. The sample 
period is from 1999 to 2007. 
 
Region 
Number of 
Obs 
ln(Sales 
Ratio) 
ln(Revenue 
Ratio) 
GDP 
Growth 
Financial 
Market  
Index 
Financial Lending 
Allocation  
Index 
Financial 
Competitio
n  
Index 
Beijing 32,462 9.69% 9.45% 11.84% 5.91 5.14 6.38 
Tianjing 31,722 6.12% 6.40% 13.05% 6.37 5.83 6.81 
Hebei 65,399 12.04% 18.51% 11.17% 6.76 7.28 6.13 
Shanxi 27,204 14.50% 17.03% 11.55% 5.51 6.92 4.65 
Neimenggu 13,956 14.25% 21.13% 15.04% 3.95 4.76 2.92 
Liaoning 57,187 13.20% 19.74% 11.09% 7.06 5.98 7.83 
Jilin 9,892 16.11% 24.20% 11.07% 4.09 2.34 5.49 
Heilongjiang 17,515 5.21% 8.01% 10.18% 2.80 2.68 2.80 
Shanghai 81,714 7.39% 8.93% 11.84% 9.19 7.77 10.10 
Jiangsu 207,291 11.65% 15.27% 12.63% 8.33 10.90 6.75 
Zhejiang 237,258 14.93% 13.40% 12.49% 9.60 10.58 8.73 
Anhui 37,793 9.75% 12.91% 10.35% 5.98 6.96 5.25 
Fujian 74,848 12.91% 14.69% 11.49% 6.43 9.48 4.24 
Jiangxi 28,138 11.34% 22.66% 10.78% 4.84 5.53 4.28 
Shandong 156,153 14.59% 24.45% 12.59% 7.75 7.18 7.97 
Henan 63,070 4.10% 8.21% 11.23% 6.45 5.84 6.91 
Hubei 51,152 8.92% 13.10% 10.70% 4.94 4.49 5.55 
Hunan 49,056 14.28% 24.65% 10.61% 5.89 6.26 5.42 
Guangdong 210,595 10.62% 12.54% 12.59% 8.31 8.81 3.44 
Guangxi 21,007 10.18% 12.97% 10.67% 4.56 6.22 2.49 
Hainan 3,577 4.50% 3.91% 10.49% 5.22 7.39 2.59 
Chongqing 19,639 11.24% 12.58% 10.74% 7.77 6.91 8.24 
Sichuan 50,768 13.09% 18.67% 10.78% 5.42 7.04 4.08 
Guizhou 13,699 9.51% 10.65% 10.52% 4.26 4.52 3.95 
Yunnan 16,614 7.54% 8.95% 9.06% 5.64 5.79 5.20 
Xizang 829 9.11% 6.76% 11.84% 1.90 6.81 0.67 
Shanxi 19,740 7.48% 10.25% 11.48% 6.16 6.77 5.93 
Gansu 10,525 6.00% 10.25% 10.32% 4.35 4.76 4.22 
Qinghai 2,335 11.17% 8.69% 11.35% 3.01 5.79 0.22 
Ningxia 4,016 13.10% 14.25% 10.75% 6.05 6.40 5.60 
Xinjiang 9,764 8.16% 8.14% 9.56% 3.65 5.28 2.00 
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TABLE 2 
Panel A：Results of Regressing Changes in SG&A on Changes in Sales Revenue 
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This table presents the results of regressing changes in SG&A on changes in sales revenue. The main sample includes 1,051,966 
firm observations from the Annual Industrial Survey Database. We also include a sample of Chinese public firms for comparison. 
The full public sample includes 9,171 public firm-year observations during the period 1999-2007 (using CSMAR database). The 
matched industry sample includes all public firms from the same three industries as our main sample. Decrease_Dummyi,t is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue of firm i for period t is less than that in the preceding period, and 0 otherwise. The 
coefficients of year and industry dummies are not reported. The standard errors of all the regressions are estimated by Huber-White 
sandwich estimators. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Full sample All public firms Matched industries Non-matched industries 
β0 0.0263*** 0.1517*** 0.2205*** 0.1563*** 
 （5.07（ (4.30) (3.36) (3.94) 
γ1 0.5540*** 0.4954*** 0.5607*** 0.4312*** 
 （237.78） (32.18) (26.24) (19.27) 
λ1 0.0117*** -0.1569*** -0.2055*** -0.0988** 
 （2.67） (-4.98) (-4.56) (-2.21) 
Adjusted R2 0.1995 0.1663 0.1618 0.1752 
N 1,051,966 9,171 5,672 3,499 
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Panel B：Results of Regressing Changes in SG&A on Changes in Sales Revenue in Three Sub-groups of 
Firms 
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This table presents the results of regressing changes in SG&A on changes in sales revenue. We keep only private firms in our main 
sample and divide them into three groups by firm size. Sizei,t is the nature logarithm of total assets of firm i for period t. 
Decrease_Dummyi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue of firm i for period t is less than that in the preceding period, and 
0 otherwise. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are not reported. The standard errors of all the regressions are estimated 
by Huber-White sandwich estimators. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Small Firms Median Firms Large Firms 
β0 0.0192* 0.0218*** 0.0455*** 
 (1.79) (2.52) (6.48) 
γ1 0.4939*** 0.5465*** 0.6008*** 
 (101.46) (136.56) (172.76) 
λ1 0.1420*** 0.0113 -0.0925*** 
 (16.59) (1.51) (-13.49) 
Adjusted R2 0.1666 0.1946 0.2405 
N 289,708 356,279 400,307 
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TABLE 3 
Results of Regressing Changes in SG&A on Changes in Sales Revenue Including the Effect of Access to 
Capital 
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This table presents the results of regressing changes in SG&A on changes in sales revenue including the effect of access to capital. 
The full sample includes 1,051,966 firm-year observations during the period 1999-2007. RFD1i,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
a firm is located in a region with financial development index above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. RFD2i,t is the original 
value of regional financial development index. RFD3i,t is natural logarithm of regional financial development index. 
Decrease_Dummyi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue of firm i for period t is less than that in the preceding period, and 
0 otherwise. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are not reported. The standard errors of all the regressions are estimated 
by Huber-White sandwich estimators. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 RFD1 RFD2 RFD3 
β0 0.0316*** 
（6.28） 
0.0363*** 
（7.13） 
0.0312*** 
（6.14） 
γ1 0.5403*** 
（190.81） 
0.5130*** 
（71.08） 
0.5294*** 
（49.41） 
γ2 0.0341*** 
（9.46） 
0.0052*** 
（6.15） 
0.0122** 
（2.37） 
λ1 0.0374*** 
（7.20） 
0.0992*** 
（8.21） 
0.0666*** 
（3.97） 
λ2 -0.0652*** 
（-9.92） 
-0.0115*** 
（-7.77） 
-0.0280*** 
（-3.40） 
Adjusted R2 0.1997 0.1996 0.1995 
N 1,051,966 1,051,966 1,051,966 
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TABLE 4 
Results of Regressing Changes in SG&A on Changes in Sales Revenue Including the Financial 
Competition and Financial Lending Sub-indexes 
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This table presents the results of regressing changes in SG&A on changes in sales revenue including the effect of access to capital 
and regional economic development. The sample period is 1999-2007. FC/FLi,t are two dummy variables equal to 1 if a firm is 
located in regions with financial competition/financial lending index above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. 
Decrease_Dummyi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue of firm i for period t is less than that in the preceding period, 
and 0 otherwise. We estimate the regressions in the total sample and Non-SOE sample. The standard errors of all the regressions 
are estimated by Huber-White sandwich estimators. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
          Financial Competition             Financial Lending 
    full sample Non-SOEs full sample                                   Non-SOEs 
β0 0.0282*** 
（5.61） 
0.0140** 
（2.31） 
0.0333*** 
（6.61） 
0.0217*** 
（3.57） 
γ1 0.5507*** 
（202.52） 
0.5520*** 
（237.50） 
0.5320*** 
（185.25） 
0.5319*** 
（228.41） 
γ2 0.0084** 
(2.30) 
0.0020 
(0.66) 
0.0577*** 
（6.48） 
0.0510*** 
（16.61） 
λ1 0.0122** 
-（2.41） 
0.0282*** 
（6.10） 
0.0349*** 
（6.48） 
0.0588*** 
（12.01） 
λ2 -0.0015 
(-0.22) 
-0.0093* 
(-1.66) 
-0.0638*** 
（-9.83） 
-0.0801*** 
（-13.25） 
Adjusted R2 0.1995 0.1906 0.1999 0.1909 
N 1,051,966 729,674 1,051,966 729,674 
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TABLE 5 
Results of Regressing Changes in SG&A on Changes in Sales Revenue Including the Effect of Access to 
Capital and Regional Economic Development 
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This table presents the results of regressing changes in SG&A on changes in sales revenue including the effect of access to capital 
and regional economic development. The full sample includes 691,045 firm-year observations during the period 1999-2007. 
RFD1i,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is located in regions with financial development index above the sample median, 
and 0 otherwise. RFD2i,t is the original value of regional financial development index. RFD3i,t is nature logarithm of regional 
financial development index. Decrease_Dummyi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue of firm i for period t is less than 
that in the preceding period, and 0 otherwise. Successive_Decreasei,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue in period t-1is 
less than the revenue in t-2, and 0 otherwise. Growthi,t is the percentage growth in real GNP during year t. AIi,t is asset intensity 
defined as assets to sales revenue. EIi,t is employee intensity defined as employees to sales revenue. RGNPi,t is the percentage 
growth in real GNP in each region. The standard errors of all the regressions are estimated by Huber-White sandwich estimators. 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 RFD1 RFD2 RFD3 
β0 0.0439*** 
（7.08） 
0.0480*** 
（7.70） 
0.0455*** 
（7.31） 
γ1 0.6305*** 
（32.33） 
0.6238*** 
（31.93） 
0.5982*** 
（28.06） 
γ2 0.0244*** 
（4.88） 
0.0081*** 
（5.62） 
0.0319*** 
（3.36） 
γ3 
 
-0.1110*** 
（-21.65） 
-0.1103*** 
（-21.51） 
-0.1104*** 
（-21.54） 
γ4  -0.2261** 
（-2.41） 
 
-0.4228*** 
（-4.56） 
-0.3842*** 
（-4.16） 
γ5  -0.0061*** 
（-2.55） 
 
-0.0055** 
（-2.31） 
-0.0057** 
（-2.39） 
γ6  0.0823 
（0.24） 
 
0.1415 
（0.42） 
0.1041 
（0.31） 
γ7 -0.3053* 
（-1.75） 
-0.4398** 
（-2.40） 
-0.2885 
（-1.57） 
λ1 -0.1221*** 
（-3.80） 
-0.1113*** 
（-3.46） 
-0.0757** 
（-2.20） 
λ2 -0.0649*** 
（-7.41） 
-0.0136*** 
（-5.58） 
-0.0424*** 
（-2.94） 
λ3 0.1708*** 
（20.21） 
 
0.1691*** 
（20.02） 
0.1688*** 
（19.98） 
λ4 -0.2026 
（-1.18） 
 
0.2347 
（1.39） 
0.1609 
（0.96） 
λ5 0.0046* 
（1.74） 
 
0.0041 
（1.57） 
0.0045* 
（1.70） 
λ6 0.4685 
（1.24） 
 
0.4381 
（1.16） 
0.5069 
（1.34） 
λ7 1.1834*** 
（3.93） 
 
1.1985*** 
（3.78） 
0.8308*** 
（2.64） 
Adjusted R2 0.1782 0.1781 0.1781 
N 691,045 691,045 691,045 
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TABLE 6 
Results of Regressing Changes in SG&A on Changes in Sales Revenue with Two Way Clustering 
Standard Errors by Region and Year  
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This table presents the results of regressing changes in SG&A on changes in sales revenue including the effect of access to capital 
and clustering standard errors by region and year. The full sample includes 1,051,966 firm-year observations during the period 
1999-2007. RFD1i,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is located in regions with financial development index above the sample 
median, and 0 otherwise. Decrease_Dummyi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue of firm i for period t is less than that in 
the preceding period, and 0 otherwise. Successive_Decreasei,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue in period t-1is less than 
the revenue in t-2, and 0 otherwise. Growthi,t is the percentage growth in real GNP during year t. AIi,t is asset intensity defined as 
assets to sales revenue. EIi,t is employee intensity defined as employees to sales revenue. RGNPi,t is the percentage growth in real 
GNP in each region. The standard errors of all the regressions are clustered by region and by year. ***, **,* indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
β0 0.0316** 
（2.37） 
0.0439*** 
（3.59） 
γ1 0.5403*** 
（32.45） 
0.6305*** 
（18.85） 
γ2 0.0341 
（1.16） 
0.0244 
（0.49） 
γ3 
 
 -0.1110*** 
（-5.98） 
γ4   
 
-0.2261* 
（-1.65） 
γ5   
 
-0.0061 
（-0.76） 
γ6   
 
0.0823 
（0.11） 
γ7  -0.3053 
（-0.66） 
λ1 0.0374* 
（1.87） 
-0.1221** 
（-2.08） 
λ2 -0.0652*** 
（-2.97） 
-0.0649** 
（-2.45） 
λ3  
 
0.1708*** 
（7.74） 
λ4  
 
-0.2026 
（-1.21） 
λ5  
 
0.0046 
（0.63） 
λ6  
 
0.4685 
（0.62） 
λ7  
 
1.1834** 
（2.49） 
Adjusted R2 0.1997 0.1782 
N 1,051,966 691,045 
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TABLE 7 
Results of Regressing Changes in SG&A on Changes in Sales Revenue Including the Effect of Access to 
Capital by Using Regional Lending Allocation Index 
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This table presents the results of regressing changes in SG&A on changes in sales revenue including the effect of access to capital 
by using regional lending allocation index. The full sample includes 1,051,966 firm-year observations during the period 1999-
2007. RLA,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is located in regions with lending allocation index above the sample median, 
and 0 otherwise. Decrease_Dummyi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue of firm i for period t is less than that in the 
preceding period, and 0 otherwise. Successive_Decreasei,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue in period t-1is less than 
the revenue in t-2, and 0 otherwise. Growthi,t is the percentage growth in real GNP during year t. AIi,t is asset intensity defined as 
assets to sales revenue. EIi,t is employee intensity defined as employees to sales revenue. RGDPi,t is the percentage growth in real 
GNP in each region. The standard errors of all the regressions are estimated by Huber-White sandwich estimators. ***, **,* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
β0 0.0333*** 
（6.61） 
0.0482*** 
（7.76） 
γ1 0.5321*** 
（185.25） 
0.6422*** 
（32.78） 
γ2 0.0577** 
（16.27） 
0.0678*** 
（13.62） 
γ3 
 
 -0.1115*** 
（-21.76） 
γ4   
 
-0.1255 
（-1.35） 
γ5   
 
-0.0050** 
（-2.10） 
γ6   
 
0.0134 
（0.04） 
γ7  -0.6674*** 
（-3.78） 
λ1 0.0349*** 
（6.48） 
-0.1299*** 
（-4.02） 
λ2 -0.0638*** 
（-9.83） 
-0.0719*** 
（-8.30） 
λ3  
 
0.1694*** 
（20.07） 
λ4  
 
-0.1373 
（-0.81） 
λ5  
 
0.0039 
（1.46） 
λ6  
 
0.6086* 
（1.62） 
λ7  
 
1.1786*** 
（3.89） 
Adjusted R2 0.1999 0.1785 
N 1,051,966 691,045 
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TABLE 8 
Results of Regressing Changes in SG&A on Changes in Sales Revenue Including the Effect of Access to 
Capital by Using Tight Lending Regulation Dummy 
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This table presents the results of regressing changes in SG&A on changes in sales revenue including the effect of access to capital 
by using tight lending regulation dummy. The full balanced sample includes 142,730 firm-year observations during the period 
from 2003 to 2004. TLRt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the sub-period is 2004, and 0 otherwise. Decrease_Dummyi,t is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the revenue of firm i for period t is less than that in the preceding period, and 0 otherwise. 
Successive_Decreasei,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue in period t-1is less than the revenue in t-2, and 0 otherwise. 
AIi,t is asset intensity defined as assets to sales revenue. EIi,t is employee intensity defined as employees to sales revenue. The 
standard errors of all the regressions are estimated by Huber-White sandwich estimators. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
  full sample full sample regulated 
industries 
regulated 
industries 
non-
regulated 
industries 
non-regulated 
industries 
β0 0.0885*** 
（6.99） 
0.0877*** 
（6.44） 
0.0768* 
（1.64） 
0.0745 
（1.43） 
0.1073*** 
（7.43） 
0.1096*** 
（7.08） 
γ1 0.5989*** 
（74.80） 
0.6080*** 
（51.93） 
0.6057*** 
（33.76） 
0.5613*** 
（19.23） 
0.5983*** 
（93.20） 
0.6148*** 
（64.18） 
γ2 -0.0559*** 
（-4.59） 
-0.0063 
（-0.47） 
-0.1154*** 
（-4.37） 
-0.0194 
（-0.62） 
-0.0472*** 
（-4.92） 
-0.0087 
（-0.34） 
γ3 
 
  -0.1216*** 
（-11.20） 
 -0.1517*** 
（-6.27） 
 -0.1171*** 
（-13.77） 
γ4 
 
-0.0143*** 
（-2.65） 
 -0.0210 
（-1.44） 
 -0.0139*** 
（-3.40） 
γ5 
 
-0.5577 
（-0.77） 
 3.4868* 
（1.60） 
 -1.0311* 
（-1.65） 
λ1 -0.0949*** 
（-5.18） 
-0.1069*** 
（-4.28） 
-0.2053*** 
（-4.60） 
-0.1197** 
（-1.99） 
-0.0827*** 
（-5.75） 
-0.1097*** 
（-5.61） 
λ2 0.1413*** 
（5.70） 
0.0807*** 
（2.98） 
0.3428*** 
（6.10） 
0.2128*** 
（3.35） 
0.1154*** 
（6.08） 
0.0648*** 
（3.11） 
λ3 
 
0.1511*** 
（7.45） 
 0.0843* 
（1.84） 
 0.1601*** 
（10.32） 
λ4 
 
0.0234*** 
（3.66） 
 0.0524*** 
（3.15） 
 0.0202*** 
（4.17） 
λ5 
 
-0.8733 
（-0.96） 
 -8.8146 
（-3.51） 
 0.1368 
（0.18） 
Adjusted R2 0.2005 0.1904 0.1899 0.1737 0.2020 0.1929 
N 142,730 126,554 16,444 14,445 126,286 112,109 
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Appendix: Industry Variable Definition and the Corresponding Name 
The classification is according to 2-digit SIC applied by the NBSC in 2002. 
 
 
Industry  Variable 
definition 
Corresponding Name of Each Industry 
Mining and quarrying 
 
In1 Mining and washing of coal 
In2 Extraction of petroleum and natural gas 
In3 Mining of ferrous metal ores 
In4 Mining of non-ferrous metal ores 
In5 Mining and processing of nonmetal ores 
 In6 Mining of other ores n.e.c 
Manufacturing In7 Processing of food from agricultural products 
In8 Manufacture of foods 
In9 Manufacture of beverage 
In10 Manufacture of tobacco 
In11 Manufacture of textile 
In12 Manufacture of textile wearing apparel, footwear, and caps 
In13 Manufacture of leather, fur, feather and its products 
In14 Processing of timbers, manufacture of wood, bamboo, rattan, 
palm, and straw products 
In15 Manufacture of furniture 
In16 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
In17 Printing, reproduction of recording media 
In18 Manufacture of articles for culture, education and sport 
activity 
In19 Processing of petroleum, coking, processing of nucleus fuel 
In20 Manufacture of chemical raw material and chemical products 
In21 Manufacture of medicines 
In22 Manufacture of chemical fiber 
In23 Manufacture of rubber 
In24 Manufacture of plastic 
In25 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 
In26 Manufacture and processing of ferrous metals 
In27 Manufacture and processing of non-ferrous metals 
In28 Manufacture of metal products 
In29 Manufacture of general purpose machinery 
In30 Manufacture of special purpose machinery 
In31 Manufacture of transport equipment 
In32 Manufacture of electrical machinery and equipment 
In33 Manufacture of communication equipment, computer and 
other electronic equipment 
In34 Manufacture of measuring instrument and machinery for 
cultural activity and office work 
In35 Manufacture of artwork, other manufacture n.e.c 
In36 Recycling and disposal of waste 
Production and 
supply of electricity,  
gas and water 
In37 Production and supply of electric power and heat power 
In38 Production and distribution of gas 
In39 Production and distribution of water 
